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Critical Notices
Jamie Cassels* The Revival of Tort Theory in
Canada
[Review of Tort Theory, edited by Ken Cooper-Stephenson and Elaine Gibson,
(Toronto: Captus University Publications, 1993). 434 pp.]
Tort scholarship in Canada has not traditionally been preoccupied with
theory. Apart from several fine (doctrinally oriented) texts, by far the
greatest amount of tort writing found in the journals is ad hoc and
responsive to current is sues. It consists for the most part of case comments
or 'recent development' articles inspired by important decisions from
higher courts. Beyond this, a number of substantive topics and problem
areas have recently been dealt with in some detail. There is alarge amount
of literature, for example, on the liability of public authorities and
professionals, sporting injuries, asbestos and environmental liability, and
associated problems of proving causation. Certain doctrinal problems are
also Canadian favourites, perhaps most obviously, the interrelation of
contract and tort and associated problems of negligent misstatement,
liability for economic loss, and products liability. In recent years certain
theoretical orientations (especially feminist theories and economic analy-
sis) have begun to inform the treatment of substantive tort issues. But
what is missing is any strong tradition of theoretical inquiry into the
fundamental structure and function of the law of tort.'
One possible reason for the theoretical gap may be that there has been
a (relatively) settled consensus on many of the 'theoretical' questions-
a consensus shared, by and large, by academics, lawyers and judges. This
consensus is formed around a postrealist acceptance of the 'open tex-
tured'2 (if not indeterminate) nature of legal doctrine and an instrumen-
talist understanding of its social function. Tort scholars of the sixties and
seventies understood tort as a body of law organized around general (and
plastic) concepts and principles (foreseeability, fault, intent, causation)
* Faculty of Law, University of Victoria.
1. The one exception to this statement is the prodigious output of Ernest Weinrib in his project
of establishing a formalist conception of tort law. His contribution to this collection is discussed
infra.
2. This phrase is drawn from H.L.A. Hart, Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1961).
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capable of elaboration and growth when guided by sound policy consid-
erations, Those considerations include first and foremost the goals of
compensation and deterrence. In addition, it was thought, as a method of
dispute resolution designed to keep the peace, the elaboration of tort
should accord with social norms regarding personal responsibility, fault
and corrective justice. In addition, the law serves to highlight certain
social ills, educate the public, and provide a mechanism for private
citizens to maintain a check on abuses of public and private power.
This understanding of law was sufficiently pluralistic that it offered
something for everyone and satisfied most needs for a 'theoretical'
orientation for scholarship and practice. It provided judges with both the
policies and principles required to bolster their decisions in hard cases. It
provided lawyers with good arguments for their clients and with a
stronger sense that their work in fact made the world a better place. It
provided academics with all of these same benefits, especially the sense
that their subject matter was important and that their work made some
small contribution to the common good. Thus, with theoretical matters
settled, academics, lawyers and judges could simply get on with the task
of elaborating what it all meant in practice.
In light of the story so far, the appearance of the recent book entitled
Tort Theory3 (edited by Ken Cooper-Stephenson and Elaine Gibson)
would be surprising. But there is more to the story. As the various works
in this collection reveal, the previous theoretical consensus has broken
down, giving rise once again to a felt need to re-evaluate fundamental
questions in tort law. Once on the margins, but moving towards the centre,
two strains of intellectual inquiry have gradually eroded confidence in the
largely instrumentalist conception underlying most tort scholarship. On
the one hand, empirical work (mostly done elsewhere in the common law
world) has called into question whether the law does in fact achieve its
stated purposes. And on the other hand, a rather strange alliance of moral
philosophers and business lawyers have criticized the 'social engineer-
ing' orientation of instrumentalism, and have called into question whether
the law even should attempt to achieve its stated purposes.
Tort Theory, a collection of fifteen papers from a conference in 1992,
represents both of these strands. It also contains essays fighting a rearguard
action to uphold the old consensus (though in modified form), as well as
several essays exploring whether there might be a new understanding of the
social function of tort. The remainder of this essay elaborates upon the
themes of contemporary tort theory as they emerge from this collection.
3. K. Cooper-Stephenson &E. Gibson, eds., (Toronto: Captus University Publications, 1993)
[hereinafter Tort Theory].
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I. The Crumbling Consensus: Tort Under Attack
The first cracks in the tort consensus began to appear as much as two
decades ago as 'law and society' scholars, with an emerging empirical
orientation, began to hint at the possibility that tort law did not always
keep its promises; indeed, that its goals might in fact be contradictory (for
example insurance versus deterrence, compensation versus corrective
justice) and unachievable. In the past decade, the cracks have become
massive fissures, and the critics of tort law (joined in recent years by
critical legal studies scholars) have in fact moved to the centre of tort
scholarship. They point out that the law is doctrinally incoherent, that
there is little evidence that it achieves deterrence,4 that it is a total failure
in terms of providing compensation,5 that it is an extraordinarily expen-
sive way6 to get inadequate compensation7 to a minuscule fraction of the
people who might need it,' and that the primary beneficiaries of the
system are lawyers. In the result, a new counter-consensus has emerged
that tort law does not work, or worse, that it works positive harm.
Several of the essays in Tort Theory are representative of this counter-
consensus. As such, they are in some ways the most radical and the most
conventional. They are radical in that they call for the restriction or
outright abolition of tort law in certain fields. They are conventional, in
that they draw upon the above-mentioned scholarly consensus to make
their case. In "Tort Law and the Crown: Administrative Compensation
and the Modem State"9 David Cohen argues against the expansion of
4. See, for example, D. Dewees & M. Trebilcock, "The Efficacy of the Tort System and its
Alternatives: a Review of Empirical Evidence" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L. J. 57-138.
5. See, for example, T. Ison, The Forensic Lottery: a Critique on Tort Liability as a System
of Personal Injury Compensation (London: London Staples Press, 1967).
6. Even in the relatively straightforward area of automobile accidents, studies estimate that
less than 50 cents of every dollar ultimately goes to providing compensation. Ontario, Report
of Ontario Task Force on Insurance (Toronto: Ministry of Financial Institutions, May 1986)
(Chair: D.W. Slater) at 66-67.
7. The inadequacy of compensation stems from a variety of sources. First, most victims of
injury receive no compensation whatever through the tort system. Second, those who do will
have to pay legal fees in the order of 20-40% of their awards. Third, because of the 'crystal ball
gazing' required by the lump sum compensation system, awards areboundto be inaccurate (too
high and too low) (seethe comments inAndrewsv. Grandand ToyAlberta Ltd., [1978] 2S.C.R.
229 at 251; 83 D.L.R. (3d) 452). Finally, most cases never reach court and are settled for less
than adequate compensation (see D. Harris et al., Compensation and Support for Illness and
Injury (London: Oxford University Press, 1984) at 92-123.
S. Studies inEngland have found that nearly 90% ofaccident victims receive no compensation
through the tort system, and if the definition of "accident" were broadened to include victims
of non-traumatic (but socially caused) illness and injury, the figure would be much higher. See
D. Harris et al., Compensation and Supportfor Illness and Injury (London: Oxford University
Press, 1984); and J. Stapleton, Disease and the Compensation Debate (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986).
9. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 361-393.
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crown liability in tort suggested by Just v. British Columbia.1° He argues
that the policy/operational distinction is unworkable, and is simply a
cover for conclusions reached on other grounds that certain governmental
functions should or should not be subject to tort review. He argues that the
intrusion of tort into governmental functions ignores the fact that there are
better ways to solve the problem of government-caused harm, and that it
expresses a very conservative agenda or ideology. Given the realities of
the bureaucratic context, tort law is unlikely to be effective at any rate. It
ignores the fact that individual-government relations are entirely unlike
private relations because the modem state is "engaged in a range of
interventionist activities which have no private analogues."" Cohen is
not arguing that individuals injured by government action should not
receive compensation; only that tort law is inadequate and inappropriate
to the task. Indeed, he argues that tort law necessarily compensates too
few people, privileging only a very small minority of the population. He
suggests, instead, that losses caused by government actions might be
widely compensable through a public benefits program that recognizes
that such losses are the inevitable consequence of government action and
should be borne widely by the taxpayers who are the beneficiaries of such
programs. He goes on to examine what those alternative programs and
institutions might look like.
Bruce Feldthusen, in an essay entitled "If This is Torts, Negligence
Must Be Dead,"'" paints an even bleaker picture with an even broader
brush. He argues that "personal injury negligence law is at best useless,
and more probably harmful, and ought to be abolished on that account."' 3
Negligence law is irrelevant in about 90% of cases involving accidental
injury, and in almost all cases of illness however caused. Workers
compensation and other no-fault schemes limit tort rights considerably,
and in most other cases of injury there is simply no one to sue. Even in the
residual area where negligence law is operative, it is unnecessary, and
little would be lost by abolishing negligence. Entitlement to compensa-
tion is a lottery and, argues Feldthusen, "No rational citizen would
conceive of the right to sue in negligence as a form of accident insurance.
No one rationally eschews accident insurance on the ground that she or
10. [ 1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228 at 1244, in which the Supreme Court suggested that "in general the
duty of care owed in tort by the government is the same as that owed by one private person to
another."
11. Tort Theory supra note 3 at 366.
12. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 394-416.
13. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 396.
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he already has sufficient protection through the tort system.'1 4 Nor does
negligence law promote any form of deterrence, given the presence of
insurance and the realities of most forms of accident causing behaviour.
The types of incentives imagined by deterrence theory are effective only
in the very small number of accidents caused by advertent or decisional
negligence.
This is not to say, however, that negligence law is merely useless and
benign. Feldthusen argues that it generates positive social costs. The fear
of liability and uncertainty created by law impose significant defensive
costs on shareholders and consumers, and valuable social resources and
energies are used up in the maintenance of the tort system that might be
more effectively deployed on other safety and compensation initiatives.
As a path to reform, Feldthusen recommends entirely abolishing negli-
gence law (even without replacing it with public no-fault)1 5 or at least
reformulating it in such narrow terms that it would hardly be recogniz-
able.
Robert Maisey and Allan Hutchinson add some weight to the skeptical
position with a Critical Legal Studies inspired account of tort law entitled
"Blurred Visions: The Politics of Civil Obligation.' 6 Using cases con-
cerning economic loss and the relation between contract and tort as their
vehicle, they demonstrate that tort law is doctrinally indeterminate; yet
because it is not autonomous from other socio-economic forces, it has a
certain coherence and predictability within its wider social context.
Ultimately, they contend tort law is but one arena within which contend-
ing individualist and communitarian visions of social life struggle for
recognition. The recent restriction of liability for economic loss, and
resurgent judicial enthusiasm for contractual forms of social ordering is,
they contend, largely explicable in terms of a general ideological shift in
western politics generally. We thus learn that while doctrinally incoher-
ent, tort law is at least partly determined by ideology, and that ideology
is likely to be the one most congenial to those with power. Thus, not only
does tort law then fail in its compensation and deterrence goals, but as a
political arena with limited access, it is also unlikely to offer much scope
for social change.
14. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 407. Indeed, argues Feldthusen, the reality of many large-
stakes negligence claims is that they are often simply disputes between two insurers about who
should bear the loss.
15. As Feldthusen points out, the primary compensation system already exists in terms of a
mix of public programs and private insurance, and any gap could be filled by small extensions
of either.
16. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 276-311.
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HI. The Crumbling Consensus: Formalist Revision
At this point, one might think it is time to abandon the law of tort
altogether, as something which displays no intellectual coherence, and
fails to achieve any worthwhile goals. But, as mentioned above, there is
another recent critical strand of tort scholarship which takes a surpris-
ingly different tack. While agreeing that tort law falls to achieve the goals
set for it by earlier writers, some see this not as a failure of tort, but rather
a failure of theory. Instead of dancing on the grave of tort law, they
celebrate the opportunity for the law to cast off its tired sixties garb and
to reveal its true inner essence, unclouded by concerns about social
justice.
The clearest example of this line of scholarship in Tort Theory is the
essay by Ernest Weinrib, entitled "Formalism and its Canadian Critics." 17
Formalism is the view that the law, (in this case tort law), can be
understood as an autonomous body of knowledge and practice on its own
terms. For Weinrib, the key to a formalist understanding of tort law is the
Aristotelian concept of corrective justice." Weinrib states that the es-
sence of tort law cannot be found in 'external' social or substantive goals,
but rather in the 'internal' formal characteristics of the law itself, and in
the moral structure of the relationship between the injurer and victim.
Tort law, as a branch of private law, distinct from public law is a form of
social ordering that reflects the formal relationship between individuals.
It has but one function, which is to achieve corrective justice when that
relationship is disrupted through a wrong. The structure of tort is bipolar,
and unified only by the direct relationship between injurer and sufferer
and the correlative of act and harm, liability and entitlement.
All the goals-deterrence, compensation, punishment, loss-spreading,
wealth maximization, cheapest cost avoidance-routinely adduced or
proposed for tort law are inadequate because they interrupt the direct
relationship of doer and sufferer. Such goals, accordingly, are incompat-
ible with the coherence of the private law relationship.'9
Weinrib thus agrees with other critics of tort law, that neither deterrence
nor compensation can justify tort. But from here on they part company.
For the critics, tort law's failure to promote human well-being through the
reduction of accidents or the promotion of safety is a failure, and a reason
to reform or abolish torts. For Weinrib, however, tort does not need such
17. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 6-23.
18. Weinrib's other articles include: "The Special Morality of Tort Law" (1989) 34 McGill
L.J. 403; "Two Conceptions of Tort Law" in R. Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal
Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) 29; "Legal Formalism: On the Immanent
Rationality of Law" (1988) 97 Yale L.J. 949; "Corrective Justice" (1992) 77 Iowa L.R. 403.
19. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 11.
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'external' justifications because it is not about 'social' or distributive
justice. It is solely about corrective justice. It expresses and enforces the
"right," which is the structure of norms that govern the interrelationship
between free agents.2' It has nothing to do with promoting the "good."
Thus, he concludes, "Seen as corrective justice, tort law is not an
enterprise in social engineering but an elaborate exploration of what one
person can demand from another as of right."2
Weinrib is joined in his quest for a formal understanding of tort by
Stephen Perry in "Loss, Agency and Responsibility for Outcomes: Three
Conceptions of Corrective Justice. a22 While Perry offers a critique of
Weinrib's notion of corrective justice, he also seeks to provide a similar
account of tort law, although one that accords human well-being some
moral significance. Perry's premise is that if correctivejustice starts with
a focus on agency and wrongful conduct, it cannot move to a duty to
compensate for loss of well-being (which is what tort law actually does).
Perry concludes that corrective justice must accord significance to both
agency and to loss of well-being and suggests his own "comparative"
account of liability.
In "Tort Law Reasoning and the Achievement of Good",' Bruce
Chapman also 'supports' Weinrib by arguing that tort law reasoning is
incapable of promoting any goals of public policy or distributive justice,
or indeed, any specific human good at all. Chapman argues that a program
of distributive justice requires deductive legal reasoning, that tort law is
not deductive, and that tort law cannot, therefore, serve distributive goals.
Instead, argues Chapman, tort law rests upon non-deductive formal
reasoning.24 In common law adjudication, the rules are not prior to the
cases in the way required by deductive reasoning. Instead they are
constructed out of the cloth of cases, leaving much room for non-
deductive normative creativity. Any "rule" is usually a conclusion about
interpretation, rather than a reason for a decision. Tort law rests upon too
many "irreducibly defeasible" concepts which are incapable of being
reduced to the necessary and sufficient conditions required by deductive
20. Free agency is expressive of and should be expressive of practical reason which, in turn,
is expressive of universality, the Kantian requirement that "the principle on which a purposive
being chooses to act be capable of functioning as a principle valid for all purposive beings,
whatever their inclinations or circumstances and whatever the specific purposes that might
promote their well-being." in Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 12.
21. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 23.
22. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 24-47.
23. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 73-103.
24. Chapman uses the case of Caparo Industries v. Dickman, [1990] 2 W.L.R. 358 as his
primary illustration of non-deductive formal reasoning.
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reasoning.25 Joe Smith adds some apparent support for this view in his
essay "Action Theory and Legal Reasoning 26 in which he argues that
formal legal reasoning is effective because it is more efficient than other
forms of reasoning better suited to the achievement of justice:
Legal doctrine serves to avoid better, but completely economically unfea-
sible, forms of reasoning such as practical reasoning and reasoning from
principles of moral philosophy. Legal doctrine permits precedent to function
without resort to policies or principles, except in exceptional circumstances.Y
While formalists such as Weinrib rarely search for it, there is much
'external' theoretical support for their view that the common law of tort
is not, in its social function, aimed at the promotion of redistributive or
egalitarian goals or, indeed, any significant enhancement of human
welfare. First, there is its socio-economic orientation. Common law is
roughly co-extensive with the marketplace, and there is a contradiction
between market freedom and most definitions of substantive equality.
Common law defines and protects proprietary endowments (through
property and tort law), and provides for their discretionary use and
transfer (through contract law). It thus constitutes and reflects the norms
of the marketplace. -5 It is thought to create a realm of individual
autonomy within which individuals may pursue their own interests and,
within classically liberal boundaries, treat others as they wish. Seen in this
light, private law does not simply accept social inequality-it protects
and promotes it.
Admittedly, modem legal developments significantly alter this re-
gime. A major theme of twentieth century legal developmenthas been the
curtailing of market freedom through legislative initiatives such as labour
legislation, human rights legislation, and consumer protection legisla-
tion, which are aimed at promoting a greater degree of equality. Interest-
ingly, however, these reforms have come primarily as legislative abroga-
tions of common law which has not itself changed so radically. Indeed,
the existence of such legislation has, on occasion, been taken as reason to
leave the common law undisturbed.29
25. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 101.
26. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 104-125.
27. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 108.
28. Some would argue that tort law is an exception-that contract law sets the rules of the
marketplace and tort law limits market freedom. This misses the point that tort law provides
the base-lines or outer boundaries required to create the market (especially the protection of
property and physical security, and basic market norms such as the prohibition against fraud)
and does not significantly limit market activity.
29. InBhadauria v. Seneca College (1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.) the Supreme Court
of Canada refused to recognize a cause of action for discrimination, partly because human
rights codes had occupied the field.
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The view that common law is a poor instrument for the promotion of
equality is further bolstered by established legal and political theory
which sees society divided into the public sphere of governmental action
and the private sphere of individual relations. Because common law
governs the relations between individuals in the 'private sphere,' law and
governmental action is not obviously implicated in the resulting out-
comes. In the private sphere, we tend to tolerate a greater amount of
inequality than we do in the 'public sphere.' This is thought to be
justifiable in order to preserve individual liberty. This legal-political view
is reflected, for example, in the principle that the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms does not apply to private litigation." The result of
the public/private bifurcation is that there is no consensus about when
inequality is traceable to the law, as opposed to being simply a natural
background social feature; or when inequality is a product of social
structures for which we are responsible, rather than simply the product of
individual actions or chance circumstances which we can only regret.
While a radical view would treat virtually all social inequality as a
product of the law and social structures (for example private law protects
property, property is power, power is the basis of hierarchy), the more
established view, of course, is that general social inequality is to some
extent a natural background feature of society and that the law is not so
centrally implicated.31
Moreover, insofar as tort law governs the relations between individu-
als, it leaves little room for the recognition or remediation of the types of
systemic inequality that is the focus of so much modem equality jurispru-
dence. The law typically concerns itself only with the relationship
between the immediate parties to the dispute and ignores the wider social
context in which their encounter takes place. As well, the law accepts the
prior status quo as the appropriate measure and goal ofjustice. Thus, there
is little room for the application of norms of distributive justice-norms
30. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. Dolphin Delivery (1986), 33 D.L.R.
(4th) 174 (S.C.C.).
31. Taken to its own extreme, of course, this view denies any connection between private law
and inequality. So long as the law treats individuals in a formally equal fashion, actual
inequality is not a legal concern. Nineteenth century private law, as it is often caricatured,
adhered rather strictly to this model of formal equality. The critique of formal equality, of
course, is that it not only accepts, but preserves and promotes substantive inequality by leaving
undisturbed, and licensing the exploitation of, the background differences in power between
individuals. Thus the ironic description by Anatole France, of the "majestueuse egalite des
lois," "qui interdit au rich comme au pauvre de coucher sous les ponts, de mendier dans les rues
et de voler du pain" Le Lys Rouge (1894) (Paris: Calmann-LUvy, 1916).
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that might focus on wider social inequalities that are reflected in the
relationship between the parties even before a wrong is committed.32
Weinrib is right that common law is built, by and large, on a model of
formal equality. In articulating and remedying the rights of individuals,
rarely does the law concern itself with social context or the actual relation
of the parties. All are equal and vested with the same rights and duties.
Investigation into social advantage and disadvantage rarely figures in the
analysis. So long as the law treats everyone the same, then the demands
of equality are met. It is for this reason that many are skeptical about the
capacity of common law concepts to deal with the realities of social
inequality. For example, in discussing the relationship between a woman
and her doctor in Norberg v. Wynrib, McLachlin J. was of the view that
the classical law of contract and tort are ill suited to take account of the
problem of inequality. She stated "In negligence and contract the parties
are taken to be independent and equal actors, concerned primarily with
their own self-interest," and the preservation of their freedom to pursue
that interest is still a primary legal objective.3 There is, in her view, too
little room in these bodies of law for an actual appreciation of the
imbalance in power and, therefore, to use them to analyze relationships
characterized by inequality is to adopt lenses "which distort more than
they bring into focus. '34
III. A Middle Way: Post-Instrumentalism?
Both the instrumentalist and formalist appear to agree that tort law has
little ability to achieve much in the way of social good. There is, however,
a third group of theorists represented in Tort Theory who are seeking to
define a more moderate position, either by reasserting some of tort's
traditional goals, or searching for new ways in which the law can be made
socially meaningful. The lead essay in this regard is Ken Cooper-
Stephenson's "Corrective Justice, Substantive Equality and Tort Law.' '35
In this essay Cooper-Stephenson offers a critique of Weinrib' s formalism,
32. A clear example of this problem can be found in the law of personal injury damages.
Damage awards discriminate against women and racial minorities because they reproduce
inequities in society generally. The law is designed to restore the status quo, even though the
status quo it seeks to restore is not one that any of us find acceptable. But, it is argued, the
misfortune and disadvantage suffered by many of these victims cannot necessarily be traced
exclusively to the accident. Responsibility for systemic injustice cannot be attributed to an
individual tort defendant, and cannot be remedied in a personal injury action. See J. Cassels,
"Damages for Lost Earning Capacity: Women and Children Last" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev.
445.
33. (1992), 92 D.L.R. (4th) (S.C.C.) 449 at 487.
34. Ibid. at 484.
35. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 48-68.
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arguing that formalism fails to describe law as it actually operates; that it
fails to attend to social and political context, and that it fails to accommo-
date aspirations to distributional or substantive, rather than formal,
equality. He argues that the law does, in fact, redistribute wealth and
power in ways that show a sensitivity to the problems of substantive
inequality. First, he argues, the way in which the law defines harm or loss
is influenced by community recognition of group detriment or disadvan-
tage. As an example, he cites the development of "wrongful birth"
litigation spurred in part by the legal system's growing awareness of the
perspective of women. Similarly, Cooper-Stephenson argues that ques-
tions regarding the type of fault requirement (negligence, intent, mali-
ciousness, strict liability) are influenced by distributive considerations,
as are considerations of systemic disadvantage one of the primary driving
forces for the extension of new remedies to particular groups in society.
Cooper-Stephenson concludes:
... tort [law] at one time tended to focus particularly on protection of the
advantaged-the privileged property owning classes-while denying its
protection to the less powerful. In the current social setting, however, the
interests and relationships that tort law increasingly addresses are those
concerning the underprivileged and powerless.36
In his other essay in the collection entitled "Economic Analysis,
Substantive Equality and Tort Law"37 Cooper-Stephenson continues his
project of demonstrating that tort law does/should pursue egalitarian
objectives and criticizes economic analysis on the ground that, like
formalism, it ignores the problem of substantive inequality. His primary
point is that by building the theory upon the existing distribution of
wealth, economic analysis reproduces, and in fact aggravates, inequality.
Its recommendation to "maximize wealth in society" 38 can thus have little
normative force.
In a similar, though somewhat more cautious vein, Ted Decoste,
through the lens of critical theory, 39 provides an account of the problems
and possibilities of liberal tort law. Starting with an explanation of the
liberal dilemma of reconciling individual freedom and social order, he
suggests that rights discourse is the practice of mediating the relation-
36. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 55. By way of illustration, Cooper-Stephenson refers to
Crocker v. Sundance (1988), 44 C.C.L.T. 225 (S.C.C.) and Just v. B.C. (1990), 1 C.C.L.T. 1
(S.C.C.) as examples of cases where superior resources, skill, etc. lead to a higher standard of
care (due to control power and recognition of superior wealth and loss-spreading capacity). He
also refers to the use by courts of utilitarian social calculations where risks are weighed against
benefits to third parties and society in judging liability and compensation.
37. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 131-161.
38. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 134.
39. "Taking Torts Progressively", in Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 240-275.
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ships between individuals and between individuals and the state. But this
discourse presupposes formally equal sovereign transactional subjects,
and ignores the realities of hierarchy and difference, especially in terms
of race class and gender. As such, the relationships constructed by liberal
rights will systematically reproduce and reinforce inequality. Similarly,
argues Decoste, lawyers and judges are required to ignore the particulari-
ties of the disputants, and even of themselves, and to abandon personal
values, commitments and aspirations.
Despite all this, Decoste cautiously affirms that law might be a site for
progressive practice, especially through resistance against the abstrac-
tion and universalization of legal thought. He recommends that lawyers
might assist in the struggle by the less powerful to assert their own
'biographies.' For Decoste legal discourse is a process of ongoing
construction of the social order and, borrowing from Hart, suggests that
the order is not fixed, and depends upon a normative consensus. Using the
examples of Thomas v. Norris40 (a civil assault action and false impris-
onment action in respect of a Coast Salish spirit dance initiation) and the
failure of tort law to respond to sexual harassment, Decoste shows the
imperialism of white, male tort law in its view of legal subjects and its
construction of social relations. He recommends in both cases that the
route of progressive practice is resistance to the colonizing force of law
through rejection of its 'universal' (white male) standards and the
assertion of difference.
The other essays in this volume also take the position that tort law is
flawed, though perhaps not fatally, and most build in a practical way upon
the more abstract suggestions made by Cooper-Stephenson and Decoste.
In "The Gendered Wage Dilemma in Personal Injury Damages,"41 Elaine
Gibson provides a critique of inadequate tort compensation, and, in
particular, the inadequacy of damages to female plaintiffs. Fewer women
than men receive tort damages for their injuries and when they do, they
receive less. While women may be treated with formal equality, because
its 'universal' standards are male, tort law masks and reproduces substan-
tive inequality. In particular, Gibson focuses on the use of actuarial and
statistical data in the fashioning of awards to women, demonstrating how
such data are built upon, and thus reflect and reproduce, socio-economic
patterns of inequality and discrimination. She then argues that the use of
gender-based actuarial data contravenes the spirit of human rights legis-
lation and also the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. She
recommends that damages be based not upon gender-based income
40. (1992) B.C.J. No. 210 (unreported).
41. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 185-211.
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predictions, but upon an assessment of capacities equivalent to men
(perhaps simply based on ungendered averages). More radically, she
proposes that the basis of compensation be reformulated, based upon
need rather than income replacement.
In "Measuring Pain: Quantifying Damages in Civil Suits for Sexual
Assault", 42 Kate Sutherland argues that the courts fail properly to com-
pensate victims of sexual assault because they typically focus too much
on the nature of the defendant's conduct rather than the injury caused to
the plaintiff. She suggests that courts could do a betterjob of quantifying
damages in these cases if they were to develop a better empathic
understanding of the harm suffered, and that the best way to do this would
be through personal narrative. As suggested by Decoste, the point is to
reassert the subjectivity of the plaintiff, and to "integrate into the
mainstream the views of outsiders, those whose stories are most often
excluded from the law.. ." In a similar vein, in "The Culture of the
Common Law in the 21st Century: Tort Law's Response to the Needs of
A Pluralist Society", 44 Lucie Leger argues that tort law is unduly narrow
in its concept of injury, and if the promotion of equality, respect and
multiculturalism are valid goals, the law should recognize a tort of
discrimination and recognize the emotional, psychological and social
harms wrought by intentionally discriminatory conduct. Two further
articles by Daniel Jutras and Lakshman Marasinghe explore the concept
of strict liability as possible antidotes to the common law's overly-narrow
focus on fault.45
It is interesting how modest are the claims made by those seeking to
reassert the social utility of tort law. Most of the authors here are fully
aware that tort has not yet lived up to its promises and that it continues to
operate against a backdrop of inequality and social injustice. All have
accepted the main lessons of the critics and have abandoned any grand
instrumentalist claims. Most confine themselves to the much weaker
(post modem) assertions that while law does not 'determine' anything, it
does play a role in social construction. They also contend that while law
may be primarily a reflection of the status quo that need not necessarily
always be the case, and that while legal discourse is primarily dominated
by the powerful, ways might be found to incorporate the voices of the less
powerful.
42. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 212-234.
43. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 225-6.
44. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 162-180.
45. D. Jutras, "Louis and the Mechanical Beast, or Josserand's Contribution to Objective
Liability in France" in Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 317-341 and L. Marasinghe, "Towards A
Quasi-Tort in the Common Law?" in Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 342-355.
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Conclusion and Assessment
Judged against the objectives set out by the editors, Tort Theory is a
success. The volume is intended by its editors to house a wide range of
perspectives, to encourage discussion and scholarship concerning the
jurisprudential underpinnings of tort law, and to facilitate the develop-
ment of seminars in advanced tort theory. The editors are motivated by
a belief that theoretical inquiry will ultimately assist those who must rely
on tort for redress for disability and social disadvantage, and to promote
reform or even radical transformation.
By and large, the volume delivers what it promises. A collection of
fifteen essays in one place, interspersed with the editors' brief but helpful
introductions, the book does embrace a good range of theoretical perspec-
tives, including those of analytical and moral philosophy (especially in
those works dealing with tort law as a form of corrective justice),
economic analysis, feminism and critical legal studies. The collection is
thus relatively representative 46 of the work being done in Canada today
(perhaps more accurately, in light of what I said above about the
theoretical gap in tort scholarship, the collection is the work being done
in Canada today). As such, Tort Theory should quickly become the
principal resource for anyone interested in going beyond doctrinal
exegesis in this field.
The book will also promote the editors' stated objective of facilitating
the development of seminars and would serve admirably as the anchor
text in an advanced tort seminar. One particular advantage in this regard
is that, unlike many theory collections, Tort Theory has a real coherence.
The book accurately reflects the ideological, practical and theoretical
differences that characterize contemporary scholarship and reform initia-
tives in tort law, yet the authors, while coming from widely differing
viewpoints, seem capable of engaging with one another while, at the same
time, pursuing radically different objectives and ideas. The concepts,
arguments, themes and discourse all display a certain connectedness or
commensurability. Despite their very great differences and the different
answers they give, most of the authors can be read as responding to the
questions of the social significance of tort law, and whether it can be made
relevant in modem Canadian society.
Finally, Tort Theory should also help to encourage and promote further
discussion and scholarship in the area; and good theory is undoubtedly
essential to understanding the phenomenon and practice of law, and to the
development of sound proposals for reform.
46. Missing are (uncritical) accounts of economic analysis of tort, old-style instrumentalist
(left, right or centre) accounts or any account inspired by critical race theory.
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Yet the book's ability to meet the editors' objectives is limited by
several qualifications. First of all, as is often (though unnecessarily) the
case, several of the essays are presented at such a level of abstraction, and
with such a degree ofjargon, that they are not nearly so accessible as they
ought to be. As one of the authors in the collection herself complains,
"while I concede the intellectual honesty and good faith of these ap-
proaches, they often seem unrelated to the realities of everyday life; they
are in general devoid of human context and unhelpfully obscure." 47 This
is a shame. This book could have been a vehicle for translation and
popularization of some of the less accessible theoretical work in tort. In
some cases it succeeds admirably in this regard, but in others the authors
lost the opportunity to share their ideas with a wider audience.
A related criticism is that some of the essays lack sufficient grounding
in the phenomenon which they seek to elucidate. Indeed, some are
presented with so little illustration or concretization that they practically
lack any reference whatsoever. Weinrib, for example, states that tort
theorists start with the "familiar normative practice known as tort law"
and that the point of tort theory "is not to imagine a utopia but to elucidate
this practice. ' 43 Yet his contribution consists entirely in assertions about
the structure and significance of tort "principles," "norms," and "con-
cepts," without a single example, illustration or even description of the
way in which those assertions might relate to any practice.49 In light of
this, the essay reads precisely like a story about an imagined utopia.
Most of the other authors go further, usually providing case examples
which illustrate or instantiate their points, yet even then, there is a lack of
grounding in the reality of legal processes, or at least a confusion between
illustration and demonstration of a point. Thus, other authors may also be
accused of imagining utopias. In arguing against Weinrib, for example,
Cooper-Stephenson does give examples to support his claim that tort law
attends to equality concerns. So the reader at least knows what he is
talking about. But the few examples provided hardly serve to support
ambitious claims such as the statement that tort law "frequently serves to
redistribute collective wealth for the benefit of the underprivileged and
disadvantaged at the expense of the privileged and advantaged. ''50
47. L. Leger, "The Culture of the Common Law in the 21st Century: Tort Law's Response
to the Needs of a Pluralist Society" in Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 162-163.
48. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 6.
49. With the possible exception of his assertion that negligence law instantiates corrective
justice in Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 14. 1 think I know what negligence law is, though I am
not sure I know what Weinrib thinks it is, or how it instantiates corrective justice.
50. Tort Theory, supra note 3 at 53. The issue may be one of emphasis or overstatement.
Elsewhere in the essay Cooper-Stephenson does show that he is fully aware of the limitations
of the law of tort as an instrument of social justice.
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In short, with the exception of one or two of the essays which draw
upon empirical work (usually being done elsewhere-in England for
example), the picture of law painted in most of the essays in Tort Theory
is drawn primarily from the law's self-description (or, in some cases,
from the author's imagination), relying upon the relatively abstract
statements of principle found in a very few selected appellate cases or,
indeed, simply upon general principles drawn from political or moral
theory. As such, the essays can only be extremely partial, and likely
distorted, accounts of law and legal practice. Especially in those essays
which claim to detect a moral order in the law of tort, or a strongly
progressive potential, one must ask exactly what 'law' is being referred
to here, how many individuals will be able to access that law, and whether
what judges say is really relevant to the concrete details of social order.
In short, do the pictures accurately portray anyone's reality? Without
more solid grounding not only in legal doctrine, but in the actual
processes and practices of everyday dispute processing, and without a
better account of the relation between law and social order, theory risks
being little more than a story or myth about how things would work in a
better world.
Some might object that the criticism here misunderstands what it is to
do theory; that it is demanding that theorists do empirical or sociological
work, or something different from 'theory.' The debate about what
constitutes good theory must await another day, but it seems to me that
the practice of doing theory on the back of legal doctrine alone is a little
too much like trying to describe the taste, texture and aroma of a cake after
having only read the recipe.
Despite these criticisms, I want to reiterate that Tort Theory is a
splendid contribution to Canadian legal scholarship. It fills a much
needed gap in the existing legal bibliography, and provides an eclectic,
interesting and coherent resource. My criticisms may be read simply as
the impatient demands of one reader who is anxious for more and even
better.
